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Despite increased interest in comparative philosophy within the past few decades—
including particular interest in the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy—Watsuji 
Tetsurō 和辻哲郎 has not received the attention he deserves. This is a shame. 
Watsuji was an uncommonly broad-ranging and original thinker whose work offers 
important insights into topics like culture, ethics, religion, embodiment, and self.
I here discuss Watsuji’s contributions to the latter two themes insofar as they 
form core parts of his analysis of aidagara, or “betweenness”—one of Watsuji’s 
central philosophical contributions. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of 
aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied sub-
jectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indi-
cate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical 
research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show 
how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role 
it plays in organizing our experience of self and world in everyday life. Additionally, 
I suggest the notion can, in this context of application, potentially enhance our 
understanding of and empathy for those living with schizophrenic disorders.
1  Watsuji on Embodiment and the Social Self
In contrast to other Kyoto School luminaries like Nishida Kitarō西田幾多郎 and 
Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治, who focus on philosophical topics like metaphysics, 
epistemology, logic, and religion, Watsuji’s fundamental concerns are culture and 
morality. His monumental Rinrigaku (“A Study of Ethics”) is a three-volume work 
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in which he argues that moral philosophy is first philosophy. But Watsuji’s approach 
is phenomenological. He’s not interested in abstract ethical principles. Instead, he 
focuses on the dynamics of ethical practices enacted within the embodied, emo-
tional, and cultural spaces of everyday life. As Watsuji puts it, “[t[he locus of ethical 
problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual but precisely in the 
in-betweenness of person and person” (Watsuji 1996: 10). It’s within the shared 
space of this in-betweenness—“the cluster of practical act-connections” connecting 
us—that ethical principles are made concrete as we construct, manage, and negoti-
ate social relationships (ibid., 10). Accordingly, for Watsuji, an investigation of eth-
ics begins with an investigation of self, embodiment, and intersubjectivity.
2  Situating Aidagara
These observations help frame Watsuji’s central concept of aidagara: the “between-
ness” or field of possibilities in which individuals co-exist, communicate, and con-
struct different ways of understanding and relating to one another. Yuasa Yasuo 湯
浅泰雄, Watsuji’s student, says that aidagara “consists of the various human rela-
tionships of our life-world. To put it simply, it is the network which provides human-
ity with a social meaning, for example, one’s being an inhabitant of this or that town 
or a member of a certain business firm. To live as a person means…to exist in such 
betweenness” (Yuasa 1987: 37).
Aidagara can thus be thought of as the space of community and interactive 
potential (Carter 2013: 35). But for Watsuji, aidagara is more than mere potential. 
It has a material reality; it’s embodied. Watsuji argues that culture, for example, is 
at its core the materialization of aidagara. Culture is the collective effort to establish 
structures for managing the flow and form of information and communication. The 
local practices that manage this flow—religious, educational, artistic, political, 
legal, familial, and medical practices, among others—are, along with the artifacts 
that support them, tools for organizing aidagara. In other words, they are the mate-
rial from which we fashion relationships and craft the everyday encounters of 
betweenness. As Watsuji puts this idea, “All expressions that indicate the intercon-
nection of the acts of human beings—for example, intercourse, fellowship, trans-
portation, communication—can be understood only with a subjective spatiality of 
this sort”, the subjective spatiality of aidagara (Watsuji 1996: 157).
An example will help. Consider how the material form of a Catholic confessional 
booth is crafted to manage religious and interpersonal aidagara (Krueger 2016). Its 
design shields the penitent from the judging gaze of others, including the priest who 
can only hear the confession spoken through a lattice dividing the booth in two. This 
structure minimizes embarrassment and distraction by blocking out the external 
world; it encourages a feeling of openness and trust by creating an intimate form of 
betweenness in which sins can be freely confessed and forgiven.
For Watsuji, aidagara is thus an organizing principle operating at multiple levels: 
from the particular way a mother cradles and sings to her newborn infant (Watsuji 
1996: 61–62) to the manner by which human beings co-exist as a global community 
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and conceive of their obligations to one another. But there is an important distinc-
tion to be made. On one hand, to think about aidagara at the level of global com-
munity, local culture, or even between infant and caregiver is to see aidagara as 
extrinsic to the self—that is, as the space of betweenness in which selves come 
together to form an interactive community. On the other hand, Watsuji also insists 
that aidagara is intrinsic to the self. We don’t simply exist in aidagara; it exists 
within us. It is part of the internal structure of the self (Odin 1992: 55).
Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis of the self (ningen) develops this idea. His 
discussion here is subtle. It’s also the place in Watsuji’s thinking where the influence 
of Zen Buddhism is most keenly felt, particularly with his characterization of the 
self as a dynamic nothingness or emptiness (kū) (Lafleur 1978). A comprehensive 
discussion of ningen lies beyond the scope of present concerns.1 My focus in this 
section and the next is to instead clarify the manner in which aidagara is for Watsuji 
an intrinsic feature of the bodily self.
Simply put, Watsuji argues that the self as ningen is at the same time both indi-
vidual and social, private and public. Accordingly, our thinking about the self must 
prioritize the extent to which the self is ultimately constituted by this inner dialecti-
cal tension between individuality and sociality. The self for Watsuji is not a fixed 
substance or thing but rather a dynamic process, a movement—what McCarthy 
helpfully characterizes as “a shifting network of relations being configured and 
reconfigured in time and space” (McCarthy 2011: 13). For Watsuji, this decentered, 
anti-substantialist approach to the self means that the self is not something that stops 
at the boundaries of the skin. Rather, it loops into the natural and social world via 
the network of relations and interactions constitutive of its spatially situated exis-
tence (Schultz 2013).
Watsuji develops this relational way of thinking about the self by engaging in a 
structural analysis of the Japanese term ningen (self or person), which he suggests 
highlights how the Japanese “have produced a distinctive conception of human 
being” (Watsuji 1996: 15).2 Watsuji observes that the two Japanese characters com-
prising the term ningen are person, 人, and between, 間. For Watsuji, these charac-
ters indicate that the self is, simultaneously, both solitary and social, private and 
public; the poles of singularity and plurality are built into the basic compound struc-
ture of ningen. As he tells us:
[N]ingen is the public and, at the same time, the individual human beings living within it. 
Therefore, it refers not merely to an individual “human being” nor merely to “society.” 
What is recognized here as a dialectical unity of those double characteristics that are inher-
ent in human beings. […] Ningen denotes the unity of the contradictories. Unless we keep 
this dialectical structure in mind, we cannot understand the essence of ningen. (Watsuji 
1996: 15)
1 For discussions of Watsuji’s ningen in its Buddhist context, see Odin 1992; Shields 2009; 
Kalmanson 2010; McCarthy 2011; Sevilla 2016.
2 See Odin 1992 for an extended comparative discussion of why this way of thinking about the self 
is not necessarily unique to Japan.
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What this means for Watsuji is that the self is not a fixed thing spatially confined to 
the individual. Instead, it is forged relationally—in betweenness—as one moves 
through and negotiates continually-shifting social and cultural contexts.
But we can bring out the extent to which aidagara is part of the inner nature of 
self in a more pointed way. As the previous quote indicates, Watsuji argues that 
ningen simultaneously realizes “the unity of the contradictories”, that is, individual-
ity and sociality. Negotiating this “dialectical unity” is the self’s fundamental way 
of being. And what this ultimately means for Watsuji is that the self—in its 
“betweenness-oriented being” (Watsuji 1996: 117)—is grounded in a fundamental 
emptiness (kū), or lack of fixed existence, that enables it to exist as betweenness. It 
is at this point that Watsuji most immediately helps himself to various Zen Buddhist 
notions such as emptiness, dependent co-origination, and the logic of negation in 
developing this idea (see McCarthy 2010: 12–20).
Without delving into the particulars of these Buddhist ideas, we can nevertheless 
consider an example to make Watsuji’s claim more concrete: experimenting with 
different self-conceptions in adolescence. Adolescence is when most of us are par-
ticularly preoccupied with fashioning our individuality—deciding what sort of per-
son we want to become, how we intend to define our life, what sort of projects and 
values to prioritize, etc. This self-fashioning is a dialectical process. It involves 
intentionally creating a separation or betweenness from one’s parents, including the 
beliefs and values we inherit from them, and which have largely defined our identity 
up to this point. To use the Buddhist language Watsuji favors, we actively “negate” 
or “empty” our group (i.e, family) membership in order to establish our individual-
ity. On the other hand, within this movement of negation or self-emptying we simul-
taneously affirm our group (i.e., family) membership—namely, as that which must 
be negated in the process of fashioning our individuality. And a similar group affir-
mation happens in another way, too. This is because fashioning our adolescent indi-
viduality normally involves appropriating characteristic features of yet another 
group: our peer group. We listen to the same music, wear the same clothes, adopt the 
same speech, and engage in the same activities that our peers do. In this process of 
cultivating and affirming our adolescent individuality, then, we simultaneously 
negate that individuality both by affirming our reliance on the betweenness of our 
family group as well as by defining our individuality with reference to the values 
and practices—the betweenness—of our peers.
While this dialectical movement between individuality and sociality is perhaps 
most vividly felt in adolescence, a similar dynamic is at work throughout our lives. 
According to Watsuji, this dynamic tension is precisely what it means to be a spa-
tially situated self, to exist as betweenness. Importantly, however, thinking of the 
socio-relational self as empty of fixed existence is not to affirm a kind of nihilism or 
eliminativism about the self. Rather, Watsuji conceives of the self—as aidagara—in 
terms of its creative possibility, as a spatially situated and interdependent process 
continually in-the-making. This is because an individual, Watsuji tells us, “is an 
individual only in a whole, and the whole is a whole only in individuals…In other 
words, an individual is an individual in its connection with multiplicity and totality, 
and the whole is a whole in its connection with multiplicity and individuality. 
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Human beings possess this dynamic structure of reciprocal transformation” (Watsuji 
1996: 124). Within the dynamics of betweenness, then, self and world are continu-
ally bound up in a reciprocal process of creative transformation and mutually- 
sustaining development.3
3  Aidagara Embodied
As we’ve now seen, aidagara is not offered by Watsuji as an abstract principle but 
rather as a form of relationality that is concretely embodied, both in the practices 
and things constitutive of our sociocultural communities as well as, more locally, in 
the various ways we engage with one another in everyday face-to-face contexts. 
Insofar as aidagara is both external and internal to the self—and the self is funda-
mentally embodied—aidagara is rooted in our embodied subjectivity. Watsuji 
describes this embodied dimension of aidagara as a “carnal interconnection”. This 
carnal interconnection, he continues, “is always found wherever there is between-
ness, even though the manner of conjunction may differ. We find it not only between 
a husband and a wife, but it is also clearly visible even between friends… This rela-
tion is neither physical nor psychological, nor the conjunction of the two. Generally, 
it is not an objective relatedness but a subjective relatedness in the carnal body” 
(quoted in Yuasa 1987: 47, my emphasis).
In light of Watsuji’s phenomenological orientation, I suggest that there are at 
least two ways of understanding how aidagara is embodied, both of which are of 
interest to phenomenology and psychopathology: aidagara as bodily self-intimacy 
and as intercorporeity. The first conceives of aidagara as internal to our embodied 
subjectivity; the second, as a feature of our embodied intersubjective engagements. 
I consider these two notions in turn.
4  Aidagara as Bodily Self-Intimacy
As noted earlier, Watsuji’s approach to culture and ethics adopts a phenomenologi-
cal and embodied perspective insofar as it focuses on the ways animate bodies 
inhabit and negotiate social, cultural, and geographical space. This embodied per-
spective stems from Watsuji’s early critique of Heidegger. Despite his initial enthu-
siasm for Being and Time, Watsuji was one of the first commentators to offer a 
substantive criticism of Heidegger’s neglect of embodiment. He argues that 
Heidegger’s excessive focus on Dasein’s temporal nature leads him to overlook the 
essential role spatiality plays in constituting Dasein’s structure—which means that 
Heidegger ultimately has little to say about both embodiment and intersubjectivity, 
3 This mutual dependence of self and world is a direct appeal to the Buddhist notion of the “co-
dependent origination” of all phenomena. See LaFleur 1978: 244–245.
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insofar as the former is the vehicle for the latter.4 Watsuji expresses this concern 
when he writes:
The limitation [of Heidegger’s approach] is due to the fact Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ is ulti-
mately an ‘individual’. He grasped human existence as the existence of a self. But this is 
merely an abstract aspect within the double structure of our individual-qua-social existence. 
When we grasp this double structure of human existence concretely, temporality and spati-
ality are coextensive. We can then show the truth of historicality, which Heidegger fails to 
develop fully and concretely (quoted in Arisaka 2001: 199).
With this context in mind, we can now turn to a consideration of how Watsuji con-
ceives of aidagara as an internal principle of embodied subjectivity.
Anticipating approaches to embodiment we find in phenomenologists like 
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Levinas, Watsuji argues that as embodied beings, we are 
hybrid entities simultaneously harboring both subjective and objective dimensions 
(Krueger 2013a; Krueger 2013b). To use orthodox phenomenological language, 
Watsuji distinguishes two modes of embodiment: first, the body from an internal 
perspective, or the body-as-subject; second, the body from the perspective of an 
external observer, or the body-as-object. For Watsuji, this hybrid nature of our 
embodiment reflects our dialectical nature as beings-in-betweenness. Since we are 
never wholly subject nor wholly object, we are, rather, simultaneously both; we 
exist as a “subjective spatiality” perpetually in-between pure subjectivity and 
objectivity.
To begin with the latter mode of embodiment, our bodies clearly have a material 
dimension. We are physical bodies that, like other objects in the world, have observ-
able properties (size, shape, color, texture, weight, etc.) and take up geometrical 
space. Other subjects can thus perceive my physical body from their perspective on 
the world; this aspect of my embodiment is a public affair. Moreover, I can interact 
with other bodies and the world more generally because my body is an object with 
causal powers.
To conceive of the body-as-object, however, involves more than simply acknowl-
edging the physical nature of our bodies. It’s also to understand a particular way 
subjects can relate to their bodies—that is, a mode of self-intimacy. Although I live 
in and through my body from the first-person perspective, I can nevertheless adopt 
a third-person perspective on my body and consider it from the outside: for exam-
ple, while looking at a mirror and vowing to get more exercise, scrutinizing a strange 
rash, or becoming hyper-aware of how I appear to my students as I lecture to them. 
I can also relate to my body as an object conceptually by acquiring scientific or 
medical knowledge of its parts and functions, or emotionally by adopting an attitude 
toward my body if I’m pleased with a new haircut or self-conscious of a blemish 
(Gallagher 2005). In these cases, I reflexively objectify my own body. I enact a new 
mode of self-intimacy—a reflexive betweenness distinguishing my experience and 
my body as an object of that experience—qualitatively distinct from the more 
immediate pragmatic intimacy I enjoy with my body as I spontaneously move and 
act in the world.
4 For critical discussions of Watsuji’s critique of Heidegger, see Arisaka 2001 and Mayeda 2006.
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This latter form of intimacy is what phenomenologists term the body-as-sub-
ject. This notion is meant to characterize the immediate first-person intimacy we 
have with our own body from the inside, the body experientially inhabited as we 
do things with it. From this perspective, the body is experientially manifest not 
as an object or content of my perception, belief, or attitude but rather as the 
transparent vehicle through which I engage with the world. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “I am not in front of my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my body” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012: 151).
When functioning optimally, the body-as-subject operates as a prereflective 
structure organizing experience. This means that it’s implicitly present as we per-
ceive the world and act on it, dynamically shaping in subtle ways both what we 
experience and how we experience it.5 For example, I don’t perceive the coffee mug 
on my desk as a value-neutral object with different properties like size, shape, 
colour, and texture. Rather, I perceive it as meaningful: as a purpose-built artifact 
affording a range of interactive possibilities (grasping, picking up, pouring liquid in, 
throwing, etc.) specified by the structure of the mug, the context in which I encoun-
ter it, and my experience of being a bodily subject that can do these different things. 
The mug shows up this way because I am tacitly (i.e., prereflectively) aware of 
where my limbs are in space and what sort of bodily actions (e.g., reaching for the 
mug) are possible within that space. In this way, the body-as-subject grounds our 
first-person frame of reference through which we are disclosed to ourselves as 
bodily subjects situated in the world (Legrand et al. 2007).
In light of these kinds of considerations, Watsuji argues that conceiving of the 
body simply as a “mere physiological object” is an abstraction from our more struc-
turally complex form of hybrid embodiment (Watsuji 1996: 61). We must instead 
acknowledge that our bodies realize a mode of being between pure subjectivity or 
objectivity. They are simultaneously both—and in this way, our bodies manifest an 
irreducibly “dual structure” or “contradictory” nature as subject and object, private 
interiority and public expressivity (ibid., 19: 58). Therefore “[w]hether considered 
theoretically or practically, a human body is subjective through and through, so long 
as it is an element in the activity of the subject” (ibid.: 65).
For Watsuji, aidagara can thus be thought of as internal to the bodily self in two 
ways. First, as an ontological principle specifying that we are hybrid subjects whose 
bodily mode of being is perpetually in-between pure subjectivity or objectivity. 
Second, as a principle of self-intimacy specifying two modes of betweenness 
through which we relate to these dimensions of our bodily being: the immediate 
first-person self-intimacy of the body-as-subject versus the objectifying, third- 
person self-intimacy of the body-as-object. As we’ll see, both senses of aidagara, 
5 This is what Merleau-Ponty seems to mean when he writes that “To say that my body is always 
near to me or always there for me is to say that it is never truly in front of me...that it remains on 
the margins of all my perceptions, and that it is with me” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 93). Similarly, 
Sartre tells us that “the body is present in every action though invisible...The body is lived and not 
known” (Sartre 1956: 427)
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understood as forms of self-intimacy, will be useful for understanding experiential 
the character of schizophrenia.
5  Aidagara as Intercorporeity
Whereas conceiving of aidagara in terms of bodily self-intimacy is to conceive of 
it from the first-person perspective—that is, as internal to the dynamics of an indi-
vidual’s bodily subjectivity both in terms of its ontology as well as modes of self- 
relatedness—there is another way of understanding how aidagara is embodied, 
according to Watsuji. This reading conceives of aidagara in second-personal terms, 
as operative in our embodied self-other engagements. From this perspective, 
embodiment is not confined to the individual but is rather comprised of a dynamic 
network of mutually-influencing processes that extend beyond individuals and loop 
into the world, encompassing others. More simply, this perspective sees embodi-
ment as constitutively social. To better understand this idea and its further relevance 
for psychopathology, we can appropriate a term from Merleau-Ponty and character-
ize second-personal aidagara in terms of intercorporeity (Tanaka 2015).
For Merleau-Ponty (and Watsuji), intercorporeity refers to the bodily resonance 
at the heart of our social engagements. As Merleau-Ponty puts this idea, “There is, 
between my consciousness and my body such as I live it, and between this phenom-
enal body [i.e., body-as-subject] and the other person’s phenomenal body as I see it 
from the outside, an internal relation that makes the other person appear as the 
completion of the system” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 368).
When we interact with other bodily subjects, their expressive actions—gestures, 
facial expressions, postural adjustments, intonation patterns, movements and 
manipulations of shared space, etc.—impact my bodily responses (Krueger 2011). 
A smile and friendly gesture, for instance, elicits similar responses from me and 
motivates an array of further friendly responses; a threatening gesture or aggressive 
movement, on the other hand, will compel me to pull back or tense up and prepare 
my body for my own aggressive response. My body is in this way affected by—or 
“coupled” with (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Krueger and Michael 2012)—the 
other’s expression; the kinetics, intensity, and timing of their emotional expressions 
shape my ongoing responses, which in turn feeds back onto and shape their 
responses, which return to me and impact my ongoing responses, etc. This back- 
and- forth dynamic of intercorporeity—what Froese and Fuchs term “inter-bodily 
resonance” (Froese and Fuchs 2012)—also characterizes the dynamics of group 
engagements. When I am drawn into the exuberance and energy of a lively party, for 
instance, or swept along by the collective rage of a political protest or the euphoria 
of a live concert with thousands of people, the movements and expressions of others 
literally take hold of my lived body and pull responsive movements and emotional 
responses out of me that are in sync with those of the crowd (Slaby 2014).
As Merleau-Ponty observes, the dynamics of intercorporeity are already observ-
able in infancy, shaping our earliest forms of social understanding. He offers the 
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following example: “A fifteen-month-old infant opens his mouth when I playfully 
take one of his fingers in my mouth and pretend to bite it. […] “Biting“ has an 
immediate intersubjective significance for him. He perceives his intentions in his 
body, perceives my body with his own, and thereby perceives my intentions in his 
body” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 368). At this early stage of development, the infant is 
too young to have a conceptual or intellectual understanding of others minds. 
Nevertheless, he immediately perceives the social significance of this playful ges-
ture; the playfulness of the caregiver’s gesture is mirrored in the infant’s own bodily 
response (i.e., opening his mouth), and the two together construct a shared experi-
ence of mutual understanding via this inter-bodily resonance. In a similar vein, 
Watsuji argues that “a mother’s body and her baby’s are somehow connected as 
though one. To contend that there is no such connection between them, because the 
link connecting them is not an actual cell is valid for physiological bodies but has 
nothing to do with subjective bodies” (Watsuji 1996: 62).
This characterization of intercorporeity is amply supported by developmental 
psychology. David Stern’s work on “affect attunement”, for instance, indicates 
that from the start of life, emotions are cross-modally expressed, shared, and regu-
lated (Stern 1985). Infants share affective states with others via inter-bodily reso-
nance. These joint affective states are experienced “in terms of dynamic flow 
patterns, intensities, shapes, and vitality affects (for example, crescendo or decre-
scendo, fading, bursting, pulsing, effortful or easy) in just the way that music is 
experienced as affective dynamics” (Fuchs 2013: 223; see also Krueger 2013c). 
Again, the processes that establish and sustain these exchanges are mimicry and 
synchronization of each other’s facial expressions, vocalisations, postures, move-
ments, and manipulations of interpersonal space. This suite of expressive dynamics 
establishes a reciprocal bodily link between interactants—intercorporeity—that 
leads to emotional convergence and feelings of connectedness (Bernieri and 
Rosenthal 1991; Hatfield et  al. 1993; Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Reddy and 
Trevarthen 2004; Krueger 2013d). Intercorporeity is thus a form of interaffectivity 
(Fuchs 2013). And these processes don’t end at childhood; they continue into adult-
hood, shaping the form and affective character of our social engagements (see 
Krueger and Michael 2012 for an overview).
In sum, interpreting aidagara as intercorporeity brings out the second-person 
dimension of the self-as-betweenness. Whereas interpreting aidagara as self- 
intimacy is to see aidagara as internal to the bodily subject, aidagara as intercorpo-
reity emphasizes the way that my bodily subjectivity is always bound up with that 
of others. The dynamic processes that sustain and regulate my own experience of 
embodiment and affect are intertwined with, and partially constituted by, the ongo-
ing input of other embodied subjects within our face-to-face engagements.
With this interpretation in place, I want to conclude by briefly putting Watsuji’s 
analysis of aidagara and embodiment to work in helping illuminate disruptions of 
self-experience in schizophrenia. Reports of individuals with schizophrenia suggest 
that both forms of the self-as-betweenness—aidagara conceived of both in first and 
second-personal terms, as bodily self-intimacy and intercorporeity, respectively—
can become experientially disrupted. These disruptions have profound  consequences 
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for how people with schizophrenia experience and relate to themselves, others, and 
the world more generally. Accordingly, looking at disruptions of aidagara in schizo-
phrenia not only provides an additional line of support for Watsuji’s claim that aid-
agara is the fundamental feature of human reality. Additionally, it offers a heuristic 
value. By illuminating how different modes of aidagara become disrupted in psy-
chopathology, we can acquire a greater understanding of and empathy towards the 
experience of individuals living with this disorder—instead of viewing it as bizarre 
or impenetrable—and via this empathy potentially develop more effective treatment 
and intervention strategies.
6  Disturbances of aidagara in Schizophrenia
Using Watsuji in the context of mental health is not a new endeavor. The Japanese 
psychiatrist Kimura Bin 木村敏 appeals to Watsuji’s conception of the self-as- 
betweenness in various works exploring the social character of mental disorder 
(Stevens 2003; Van Duppen 2017). For example, he observes that a cluster of pho-
bias common among Japanese patients but rarely found among non-Japanese 
patients—phobias that fall under a general “fear of facing others” (taijin kyōfu-shō), 
including a fear of one’s face being red or ugly, fear that one’s body exudes offen-
sive odors, or a fear of being looked at or making inappropriate eye contact—are 
best understood by acknowledging the predominantly other-oriented sense of self 
distinctive of Japanese culture (Kimura 1972; see also Arisaka 2001).
Based on clinical interviews with patients, Kimura also famously argues that 
schizophrenia cannot be understood simply as a brain disorder. Rather, it is a self- 
disorder, a disruption of the individual’s relationship with the lived world. And its 
core disturbance—a disturbance of the sense of “I-ness” as an ongoing subject of 
experience—simultaneously involves an intersubjective dimension, a disruption of 
the “interpersonal between” weaving individuals into their sociocultural milieu. 
These two disruptions, Kimura insists, “represent two different aspects of one and 
the same basic occurrence of schizophrenic estrangement” (Kimura 1982: 182). For 
Kimura, schizophrenia thus ultimately manifests as “a striking event of the interhu-
man world or as a pathology of the ‘between’ in the most unmediated and unequivo-
cal way” (Kimura 1982: 178–179). Accordingly, Kimura appeals not just to Watsuji 
but phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty—all of whom 
emphasize the interrelation of self and world—in developing his descriptive analy-
sis of schizophrenic experience (Phillips 2001).
I now want to briefly build on Kimura’s use of Watsuji and phenomenology to 
characterize schizophrenia as a disturbance of in-betweenness. Like Kimura, I 
agree that aidagara is a useful descriptive tool in this context. However, the inter-
pretation of aidagara and embodiment developed in the previous sections—in par-
ticular, the twin notions of aidagara as “bodily self-intimacy” and 
“intercorporeity”—can, I suggest, help illuminate subtle disturbances of embodied 
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subjectivity and  intersubjectivity that, for all its richness and originality, are often 
underplayed in Kimura’s work.
7  “To have a leash on the kite so it doesn’t fly away…”
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric illness involving the disintegration of thought and 
experience. Many working in phenomenological psychopathology have argued that 
the generative disorder of schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self. From this per-
spective, the disturbed self is not a complex linguistically or conceptually mediated 
self such as the narrative self.6 Rather, the disturbed self is what has been called the 
“minimal self” (Zahavi 2005), “core self” (Damasio 2010), or “ipseity” (Sass and 
Parnas 2003) (ipse is Latin for “self” or “itself”). These terms pick out a self con-
ceived of as a fundamental structure of consciousness—the self-as-subject for 
whom conscious episodes (thoughts, perceptions, memories, emotions, intentions, 
etc.) are given in a first-personal mode of presentation.
The minimal self captures the fact that when we perceive or remember some-
thing, for example, we are immediately aware that we are the ones perceiving and 
remembering. The experience and memory are ours; there is no reflective distance 
between the experience and ourselves as the subject of that experience. To the con-
trary, we enjoy an immediate self-intimacy with our experiences. In this sense, the 
minimal self or ipseity of awareness is not something separate from experience but 
is rather a feature of the very manifestation of experience in its first-personal mode 
of givenness (Henry 1973).
This minimal self can be disturbed in schizophrenia. Kimura seems to have this 
kind of minimal self in mind when he says that “[s]chizophrenics are profoundly 
uncertain about the I-ness of the self or the selfness of the I—aspects of experience 
that are perfectly self-evident for all non-schizophrenic persons” (Kimura 2001: 
334). Much of his work is spent unpacking various dimensions of this self- 
disturbance. Within contemporary phenomenological psychopathology, aspects of 
this self-disturbance have been explored via the so-called “ipseity disturbance 
model” (IDM) (Sass and Parnas 2003). IDM posits that schizophrenic spectrum 
disorders are characterized by a disruption or instability of the first-person perspec-
tive. This instability becomes apparent in a range of anomalous experiences typi-
cally present already in childhood or early adolescence, including depersonalization, 
diminished sense of existing as a bodily subject, a diminished sense of “mineness” 
of the field of awareness, a diminished sense of coherence and consistency in basic 
features of the self (e.g., sense of anonymity, identity confusion, etc.), and disturbed 
self-other/self-world boundaries (Parnas et al. 2005; Nelson et al. 2014).
Patient vignettes supporting IDM indicate that a persistent feature of these anom-
alous experiences is that individuals lose their first-personal “grip” on their field of 
6 Although individuals with schizophrenia often exhibit difficulty constructing and maintaining a 
narratively structured self (Gallagher 2007).
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awareness. They report feeling estranged from their experience: “I feel like I’m not 
a natural human being or a proper human being or something like that...I think it has 
something to do with the fact that I don’t feel like I have a core or substance” 
(Henriksen and Nordgaard 2016: 266). More specifically, they report feeling that 
the phenomenal vitality or immediacy of their experience is diminished: “My con-
sciousness is not as whole as it should be”; “I am simply unconscious”; “My 
I-feeling is diminished”; “My I is disappearing for me”; experiences only “appeared 
a split-second delayed” (Parnas and Handest 2003: 125).
This weakening of the first-person perspective is often accompanied by a hyper-
reflexive distortion of experience (Fuchs 2010a). Sensing the subtle destabilization 
of their first-person perspective, a compensatory response in some patients is to 
objectify their actions or the content of their experiences as a means of holding onto 
them; vigilant attention becomes a means of securing a firmer grip (i.e., self- 
intimacy) on actions and experiences they feel slipping away. This compensatory 
response is accomplished via intense reflection or self-monitoring.
But this hyperreflexivity brings about a further mode of self-estrangement. This 
is because dispositional and habitual aspects of the self that are normally present in 
the background of awareness—e.g., the way one thinks, listens, speaks, interacts 
with others and the environment, etc.—are thrust to the foreground of awareness 
and made into objects of intense scrutiny (Henriksen and Nordgaard 2016). As a 
result, the spontaneity, fluidity, and naturalness of everyday interactions is lost, and 
the individual struggles to smoothly connect with others and the surrounding envi-
ronment. This sort of hyperreflexivity is evident in the way patients report that their 
thoughts can take on spatial or object-like qualities (“dense and encapsulated 
thoughts”) (Parnas and Handest 2003: 128), for instance, or that normally spontane-
ous habits, skills, and actions (e.g., gesturing, falling asleep, putting a book on the 
shelf, sitting in a chair) are impossible to perform due to the patient’s excessive 
focus on every aspect of their performance (Fuchs 2010b).
But the self-disorder characteristic of schizophrenia extends beyond a disruption 
of the minimal self. Many patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders experi-
ence problems with their embodiment (Krueger and Aiken 2016; Krueger and 
Henriksen 2016). In light of the previous discussion, one way these problems can be 
understood, I suggest, is to see them as a diminishment or gradual loss of aidagara 
understood as bodily self-intimacy. These disturbances are characterized by the per-
sistent feeling that the individual is not fully present in or integrated with her body 
“from the inside” as a unified center of agency and experience. To be clear, this is 
not an out-of-body experience. Rather, it’s something more subtle, an attenuated 
feeling that one is wholly “at home” in or settled into one’s body as one engages 
with the everyday lifeworld.
For example, consider the report of “K”, a 25 year-old patient. In describing this 
feeling, she says that her body feels persistently alien to her:
It’s as if there is a distance between my body and my mind. It’s like my mind is a little pup-
peteer, sitting far away, controlling my body. It’s not like I see myself from above or some-
thing. But it’s like I’m not in my body or not attached to it. It’s like my body is an appendix 
that hangs below me. (Henriksen and Nordgaard 2016: 268)
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Note that K is quite insistent that hers is not an “out-of-the-body” experience; rather, 
what she seems to lack is an immediate acquaintance with her body as her own. In 
other words, K reports feeling that the different parts of her body—as well as her 
body and mind more generally—fail to cohere into an experientially integrated 
unity grounding her nature as an embodied subject. This disunity is apparent when 
she describes how she tries to “merge my thoughts and my body...to have a leash on 
the kite so it doesn’t fly away” (Henriksen and Nordgaard 2016: 268). Again, this is 
not the feeling that K is somehow outside her body but rather that she fails to seam-
lessly inhabit and live through it.
Reports of this sort are relatively common in the literature, although the charac-
ter of the diminished embodiment, as well as its qualitative intensity, can vary 
(Fuchs 2005). Individuals often say things like “the body feels awkward as if it does 
not really fit” (Henriksen and Nordgaard 2014: 435–441), or “I feel strange, I am no 
longer in my body, it is somewhere else; I sense my body but it is far away, some 
other place. Here are my legs, my hands, I can also feel my head, but I cannot find 
it again (Parnas 2003: 227).
Again, what appears to be disrupted in these cases is more than the minimal 
phenomenal self but, additionally, the individual’s sense of bodily self-intimacy. On 
one hand, patients like K experience an attenuated sense of connectedness with their 
body as lived from the inside (“the body feels awkward as if it does not really fit”). 
On the other hand, however, excessive self-monitoring (i.e., hyperreflexivity) leads 
to an objectification of the individual’s actions and compromises their ability to 
spontaneously inhabit and live through them. K describes this sort of excessive self- 
monitoring when she says “I have the experience that there are two of me: the one 
that interacts with someone and then there is the real me, who sits there behind [...]” 
(Henriksen and Nordgaard 2016: 271).
Recall that, as we’ve seen, aidagara for Watsuji is internal to the bodily self in 
two ways: as an ontological principle specifying that we are hybrid subjects whose 
bodily mode of being is perpetually in-between pure subjectivity or objectivity; and 
second, as a principle of self-intimacy specifying two modes of betweenness 
through which we relate to these dimensions of our bodily being: the immediate 
first-person self-intimacy of the body-as-subject versus the objectifying, third- 
person self-intimacy of the body-as-object. The vignettes above suggest that, in 
schizophrenic experience, the equilibrium (or betweenness) of these two modes of 
bodily being is disturbed. The body-as-subject is experientially diminished—this 
occurs via a loss of bodily self-intimacy—and, as a compensatory response, the 
individual assumes an excessively objectified self-relation that compromises their 
ability to comfortably relate to themselves and others, and to connect with their sur-
rounding environment via flexible, context-sensitive actions.
As we discussed above, the first and second-personal dimensions of aidagara 
are, for Watsuji, conceptually distinguishable but ontologically unified, two sides of 
the same coin. Accordingly, in schizophrenia, weakening or disruptions of bodily 
self-intimacy have profound consequences for the dynamics of the individual’s 
bodily engagements with others—that is, aidagara understood as intercorporeity. 
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There is evidence that various aspects of this second-personal dimension of schizo-
phrenia are similarly disturbed.
For example, schizophrenic patients lack bodily empathy—the ability to detect 
and understand others’ facial and gestural expressions (Kington et al. 2000; Edwards 
et al. 2002; Amminger et al. 2012). As a result, they often perceive others not as 
embodied subjects whose expressive actions are saturated with social meaning but 
rather as curious objects: “People turn weirdly about, they make gestures, move-
ments without sense; they are phantoms whirling on an infinite plain, crushed by 
pitiless electric light” (Sechehaye 1970: 44). Additionally, patients exhibit dimin-
ished facial, gestural, and vocal affective displays (Kring and Moran 2008). Coupled 
with their lack of bodily empathy, these disturbances lead to an experiential desyn-
chronization with others: what (Fuchs 2007) describes as a disturbance in the “tim-
ing” of face-to-face interactions (aspects like gestural synchronization and rhythm) 
that feed into and reinforce patients’ sense of social disconnectedness.
Finally, in addition, disturbances of these face-to-face bodily dynamics, schizo-
phrenic patients also show a more general lack of social understanding writ large. 
In other words, they lack an implicit understanding of the “rules of the game” gov-
erning social encounters, a sense of proportion for what is appropriate or relevant in 
social contexts (Fuchs 2015). They say things like, “I don’t really grasp what others 
are up to. […] I constantly observe myself while I am together with people, trying 
to find out what I should say or do. It’s easier when I am alone or watching TV” 
(quoted in Fuchs 2015: 200). The schizophrenic individual feels alienated from the 
aidagara everyday social environments—and the bodily and material resources that 
scaffold and regulate social encounters for the rest of us (e.g., other people, social 
norms and conventions, material culture, etc.) are experienced as closed off and 
unavailable (Krueger forthcoming). Without access to these resources, patients 
experience an intersubjective “unworlding” (Sass 1992)—what I’ve characterized 
as a disruption of second-personal aidagara—that further animates their autistic 
withdrawal.
To conclude, none of what I’ve said here contradicts Kimura’s use of Watsuji. 
Instead, it’s merely offered as supplementary analysis to bring out aspects of schizo-
phrenic experience—especially those centered around disruptions of embodiment, 
self-intimacy, and intercorporeity—that don’t receive explicit attention in Kimura’s 
work. Additionally, looking at psychopathological disruptions of aidagara helps 
reinforce Watsuji’s main claim that aidagara is a central feature of human reality, 
animating and regulating our experience of self and world. For Watsuji, we are 
selves perpetually in-between—socio-relational selves constituted by the vitality 
and dynamism of our worldly engagements. Theorists interested in exploring vari-
ous aspects of these engagements would do well to utilize the rich philosophical 
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